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CASENOTES
NEW JERSEY v. T.L.O.:* THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT GOES TO SCHOOL
State and federal courts have struggled incessantly to accommodate the sometimes competing interests of students, protected by
the fourth amendment, and the states interest in providing safe educational environments. for their students. In advancing such a discerning relationship, the school chidrens' legitimate fourth amendment expectations of. privacy have sometimes been trampled
underfoot.' In reaching what purportedly is a reasonable balance between these two interests, the United States Supreme Court has
*

105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).

1. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 738-39 n.2 (1985). Some courts have
held that school officials are exempt from the restrictive parameters of the fourth
amendment when conducting searches of students. These courts have reasoned that
when conducting such searches the officials are private parties acting in loco parentis.
See D.R.C. v. State, 646 P.2d 252 (Alaska App. 1982) (school officials compared to
foster parents); In re B.G., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361, 523 P.2d 244
(1974) (teachers are not classified as government officials under the fourth amendment); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969) (teachers
share parental right to use moderate force to obtain obedience and such right extends
to searches). In at least one case, however, the Court strictly applied the fourth
amendment to the search of a student conducted without probable cause, and held
such conduct unconstitutional. State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (La.), vacated, 423 U.S.
809 (1975). Other courts have held the "probable cause" standard applicable at least
where the police are involved in the search. See, e.g., M. v. Board of Educ. BallChatham Community Unit School Dist. No. 5, 429 F. Supp. 288, 292 (S.D. Ill. 1977)
(differentiated situation, where police are involved, requiring probable cause, from
those where school officials act alone, where lesser standard is applicable); Picha v.
Wielogos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219-21 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (probable cause must be present
where police have "significant participation" in a search of a student or where the
search is highly intrusive).
The majority of courts that have faced the issue of the fourth amendment in the
school setting have concluded that the inherent safeguards of the amendment do protect children from overreaching searches. However, the exigencies of the school environment require assessing the legality of the searches with a standard less strict than
probable cause. These cases uphold warrantless searches by school officials provided
that they are supported by a"reasonable suspicion" that the search will yield evidence of a disciplinary *rule -infraction or violation of a law. See, e.g., Tarter v.
Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 982 (6th Cir. 1984) ("quantum of suspicion" short of probable
cause), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1749 (1985); Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir.
1984) (mistaken but reasonable belief that probable cause exists is sufficient to support search); In re J.A., '85111. -App. 3d 567, 406 N.E.2d 958 (1980) (proper standard is
not probable cause but whether officials have a reasonable suspicion that a student
possesses contraband which-may endanger himself or others).
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held that probable cause' is not required to conduct a search of a
student on school property, but only that the search, in its totality,
be "reasonable." 3 In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 4 the Court reviewed the
constitutionality of a search of a student's purse by a school official.
The Court determined that the restrictions to which searches by
public authorities are ordinarily subject must be eased due to the
societal interests involved in meaningful education.5 Consequently,
to conduct a constitutionally valid search of a student, a school official need only have a reasonable suspicion to believe that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the school rules.'
Applying this reasonable suspicion standard to the circumstances at
bar, the T.L.O. Court found that an assistant vice principal's search
of a juvenile's purse was constitutional for fourth amendment
purposes.7
In March of 1980, a New Jersey high school teacher, while making a routine check of the women's lavatory, observed T.L.O. and
her companion smoking cigarettes in violation of a school rule.' Consequently, the teacher took the girls to the vice principal's office to
meet with Mr. Choplick, the assistant vice principal. Upon questioning, T.L.O. denied that she was caught smoking and claimed she did
2. The essence of probable cause requires that the facts and circumstances
known to the searching official would warrant "a man of reasonable caution in the
belief" that a criminal offense has occurred. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
162 (1925). However, probable cause depends upon "the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). The probable cause standard was intended as a "common sense" test which was applied after consideration of
the "totality of the circumstances." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
3. T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. at 743-44.
4. 105 S.Ct. 733 (1985).
5. Id. at 743-44. The Court acknowledged society's interest in education when it
stated that "[e]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments." Id. at 750 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
However, the ability to maintain environments conducive to fostering these interests
has become increasingly difficult. See generally Elam, The Gallup Education
Surveys: Impressions of a Poll Watcher, PHI BETA KAPPA MAG. Sept. 1983, at 24, 2627 (the public has consistently ranked discipline the number one problem in schools;
since 1978, drugs have placed second in priority only to discipline); NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION, VIOLENT SCHOOLS-SAFE SCHOOLS: THE SAFE SCHOOL STUDY RE-

PORT TO THE CONGRESS

(1978) (Educ. Research Instit. Clearinghouse Catalog No. ED-

175-112) (commenting on the problems of drug abuse and violence in our nation's
public schools). But cf. 0. MOLES, TRENDS IN INTERPERSONAL CRIMES IN SCHOOLS

(1983) (asserting that problems of violence and vandalism in public schools have
declined).
6. T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. at 743.
7. Id. at 745-47.
8. T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. at 737. The regulation that T.L.O. and her companion were
accused of violating was that of smoking in an area not designated for that purpose.
There were no school regulations forbidding students from possessing cigarettes or
even smoking them in permitted areas. In re T.L.O., 178 N.J. Super. 329, 341-42, 428
A.2d 1327, 1333-34 (N.J. Juv. Ct. 1980).
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not smoke at all.' Mr. Choplick then demanded to see her purse.
Upon opening the purse, he found a package of cigarettes and also
noticed a package of rolling papers, frequently associated with the
use of marijuana. 0 A more thorough search of the purse revealed a
plastic bag containing less than one fifth of an ounce of marijuana, a
pipe, forty-seven dollars in singles, and other evidence that implicated her in selling marijuana." Upon discovering these
items, Mr.
2
police.1
the
and
mother
student's
the
notified
Choplick
As a result of the evidence produced by the search, the State of
New Jersey brought delinquency charges against T.L.O. in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Middlesex County.' 3 T.L.O.
contended that the search of her purse violated the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and accordingly moved to
suppress the evidence, as well as her subsequent confession which,
she argued, was tainted by the unlawful search.' The Juvenile
Court denied the motion to suppress, adjudicated T.L.O. delinquent,
and sentenced her to one year's probation.' 5 On appeal, T.L.O.
9. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 737.
10. Id. Generally, consent by the person to be searched is a recognized exception to the protections of the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (car owner's consent to search automobile held valid as
waiver of expectation of privacy). The consent must be voluntary and must not be
the result of an overt or implied coercion. Id. at 248. On the notion of consent being
an exception to the fourth amendment, see generally Comment, Students and the
Fourth Amendment: "The Torturable Class," 16 U.C.D. L. REv. 709, 720-22 (1983)
(asserting that courts do not often use this exception in school searches because the
consent, if given, may only be in acquiescence to the superior authority of the school
official). When contraband is within "plain view" of a government official it can be
legally seized, provided that the official is lawfully in a position to have that view.
E.g., Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968). See generally Annot., 75 L. Ed. 2d
1018 (1985) ("plain view" doctrine in United States Supreme Court decisions).
11. After extending the search to a zippered compartment of the purse, Mr.
Choplick also discovered an index card listing people who owed money to T.L.O., and
two letters indicating that T.L.O. was selling marijuana. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 737.
12. Id.
13. Id. The complaint filed with the court alleged that T.L.O. had possessed
marijuana with the intent to distribute, in violation of a New jersey criminal law. See
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:21-19(a)(1) (West 1940 & Supp. 1985) (unlawful to distribute a
controlled dangerous substance), and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:21-20(a)(4) (West 1940 &
Supp. 1985) (unlawful to possess a controlled dangerous substance). Additionally, the
school imposed a 3-day suspension for smoking cigarettes in a non-smoking area and
a 7-day suspension for possession of marijuana. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 737 n.1. This
latter suspension was set aside on the ground that it was based on evidence seized in
violation of the fourth amendment. Id. (citing T.L.O. v. Pistcataway Bd. of Educ.,
No. C.2865-79 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div., Mar. 31, 1980)).
14. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 737. After agreeing to answer questions while at police
headquarters, T.L.O. admitted to owning the objects found in her purse. She further
admitted that she was selling marijuana "joints" (rolled marijuana cigarettes) in
school for $1 each. She stated that on the morning of the search, she had sold approximately 20 joints at school. Brief for Petitioner at 4, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct.
733 (1985).
15. In re T.L.O., 178 N.J. Super. 329, 343, 428 A.2d 1327, 1334 (1980). The
court concluded that the fourth amendment was applicable to a search conducted by
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raised only the fourth amendment issue which the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court, in a divided opinion, affirmed."8 T.L.O. appealed this ruling to the New Jersey Supreme
Court, which reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and
ordered that the evidence found in the purse be suppressed. 7
Seeking to reverse the New Jersey Supreme Court ruling, the
State of New Jersey petitioned the United States Supreme Court for
certiorari.' 8 The writ was granted, 9 but, after initial arguments, the
a school official. The court observed, however, that such a search is constitutional
only "if the official has a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or is in the
process of being committed, or reasonable cause to believe that such a search is necessary to maintain school discipline or enforce school policies." Id. at 341, 428 A.2d at
1333. In applying the facts of the case to its reasoning, the court found that the initial
search was justified by a well founded suspicion that T.L.O. had violated the school
rule prohibiting smoking in the lavatories. Once the purse was open, evidence of marijuana violations was in plain view providing adequate support for a more detailed
search to determine the nature and extent of T.L.O.'s drug-related activities. Id. at
343, .428 A.2d at 1334.
16. In re T.L.O., 185 N.J. Super. 279, 448 A.2d 493 (Ct. App. Div. 1982) (per
curiam). However, the court vacated and remanded the judgment finding T.L.O. delinquent for a determination of whether she had knowingly waived her fifth amendment right before confessing. Id. A discussion of the fifth amendment question, as it
relates to the facts of this case, is beyond the scope of this note.
17. In re T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 463 A.2d 934 (1983). The New Jersey Supreme
Court agreed with the lower courts that the fourth amendment applied to searches
conducted by school officials. The court also held that the exclusionary rule should be
employed to prevent the use of unlawfully seized evidence in juvenile proceedings by
school officials, recognizing that "if an official search violates constitutional rights, the
evidence is not admissible in criminal proceedings." Id. at 341, 463 A.2d at 939. See
also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to state
court proceedings); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (applying exclusionary rule to federal court proceedings). See generally Annot., 49 A.L.R. 3D 978
(1973 & Supp. 1984) (admissibility, in a criminal case, of evidence obtained from
search conducted by school official).
Regarding the legality of Mr. Choplick's search, the court noted that a search by
a school official does not violate the fourth amendment as long as the official has
"reasonable grounds to believe that a student possesses evidence of illegal activity or
activity that would interfere with maintaining order and discipline in the school." In
re T.L.O., 94 N.J. at 346, 463 A.2d at 941-42. The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the Juvenile Court's ruling that the search was reasonable on
three grounds. First, the contents of the purse had no direct bearing on the accusations made against T.L.O. Id. at 346, 463 A.2d at 942. Possession of cigarettes was not
a school rule infraction and a mere desire to discredit T.L.O.'s denial of smoking was
insufficient to justify the search. Second, even if a reasonable suspicion to believe that
T.L.O. possessed cigarettes would have justified the search, Mr. Choplick had no such
suspicion. Id. Third, aside from whether the initial search was justified, the court
concluded that the presence of the rolling papers did not justify the subsequent indepth search. Id. at 347, 463 A.2d at 942-43.
18. In its decision, the Supreme Court of New Jersey addressed three separate
issues: first, what is the proper standard to use in determining the reasonableness of a
school official's search of a student; second, given the facts of this case, did Mr.
Choplick violate that standard; and, third, whether the exclusionary rule bars the use
of evidence, in a criminal proceeding, that a school official procured in violation of
this standard. In re T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 463 A.2d 934 (1983). The State of New
Jersey, however, petitioned for review of only the third issue.
19. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 104 S. Ct. 480 (1983). Although the United States
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Court notified the parties that the case would be held over for reargument.20 The Court requested the parties to brief and argue an additional question: "Did the assistant principal violate the Fourth
respondent's purse in the facts and circumAmendment in opening
21
stances of the case?

The Supreme Court found that Mr. Choplick's conduct did not
amount to an unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth
amendment based on three considerations. First, the search of
T.L.O.'s purse did not constitute a severe invasion of her personal
privacy rights when balanced against the school's interests in preserving internal discipline and order.22 Second, the search was justified at its inception.2 3 Third, the search, as conducted, was reasona-

bly related in scope to the circumstances which led to the
interference in the first place.2 4
The T.L.O. Court initially observed that the fourth amendment25
ultimately requires that searches and seizures be "reasonable.
The Court went on to note that reasonableness depends upon the
circumstances under which the search takes place.2 6 Determining
the standard of reasonableness governing any specific search requires a balancing of the need for the search against the individual's
legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security.27
Supreme Court originally granted certiorari to decide the issue of the appropriate
remedy in juvenile court proceedings for unlawful school searches, they stated that
the more important question to address was what limits the fourth amendment imposes on school administrators. On this latter point, the Court ordered reargument.
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 738 (1985).
20. T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. at 738.
21. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 104 S. Ct. 3583 (1984). The Court's request for reargument was characterized by Justice Stevens as indictative of its "voracious appetite
for judicial activism in its fourth amendment jurisprudence." Id. at 3584 (Stevens,
Brennan & Marshall, J.J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated in his dissent from the
reargument order that the Court should have simply dismissed the writ as improvidently granted. Id. Instead, however, it granted reargument in order to resolve an
issue of which none of the litigants sought review. Id. at 3584-85.
22. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 742-43 (1985). See also Zamora v.
Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662, 670 (10th Cir. 1981) (search of a student's locker is not an
unconstitutional invasion of protected rights). But see United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798, 822-23 (1982) (searches of closed items of personal luggage are invasions of protected privacy rights); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1967) (even a limited search
of the person constitutes a substantial invasion of privacy).
23. T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. at 744.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 741.
26. Id.
27. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 741. An expectation of privacy, however, must be one
that society is willing to recognize as legitimate in order to receive the protection of
the fourth amendment. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan,
J., concurring).
The scope of this note prevents a thorough discussion of the relationship between
the fourth amendment and the constitutional right to privacy. For a general discussion on this relationship, see 16A AM. JUR. 2D CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 602 (1979 &
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The State of New Jersey contended that students have minimal
expectations of privacy for two reasons: first, students must be subjected to necessary and pervasive supervision while in school and
second, students' interests in items of personal property must be
minimized when they are carried onto school property.2" The Court
rejected both premises. First, the Court held that students retain
the same expectancy of privacy outside the schoolroom as they do
inside.2 9 Second, the Court noted that the state's minimized personal property contention was not realistic; 0 it held, just as students
"do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate,"'"
they likewise do not waive all rights to privacy merely by bringing
personal property onto school ground. 2 Nevertheless, the child's legitimate expectations of privacy must be considered along with the
substantial and equally reasonable interests of teachers and school
officials in maintaining discipline in the classroom. 3 Accordingly,
the Court reasoned, some easing of the restrictions to which searches
by public officials are ordinarily subject was required to balance
these equivalent interests. 4
Supp. 1984).
28. Supplemental Brief for Petitioner at 16-25, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S.Ct.
733 (1985). Petitioner asserted that education is compulsory, therefore "the student
has a legal duty to submit to the authority of school officials. In accordance with their
duty to maintain discipline, school officials closely scrutinize students. It is therefore
unrealistic for a student to claim more than a minimal expectation of privacy." Id.
Petitioner also argued that since school attendance is compulsory only to age 16,
some students have necessarily accepted the school regulations and resulting limitations on their privacy. Id. at 20. But cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (upholding students' constitutional rights).
29. The Court cautioned that even though the ability to maintain order and
discipline in our public schools is growing difficult, the situation is not so dire as to
believe that students can claim no legitimate expectations of privacy. The Court
noted that such a belief would liken students to criminals in prison cells and acknowledged that "[tihe prisoner and the schoolchild stand in wholly different circumstances, separated by the harsh facts of criminal conviction and incarceration [and]
[w]e are not yet ready to hold that the schools and the prisons need be equated for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment." T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. at 742 (quoting Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 (1977)).
30. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 742.
31. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
(1969).
32. T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. at 742. However, several lower courts have ruled that certain types of school searches do not infringe on student's reasonable expectations of
privacy. See Doe v. Renfrow, 475 f. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (drug detection dogs
used to sniff high school and junior high school students), modified, 631 F.2d 91 (7th
Cir. 1980); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969) (search of
locker); State v. Stein, 203 Kan. 638, 456 P.2d 1 (search of locker), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 947 (1969).
33. T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. at 742.
34. Generally, searches by public officials are unreasonable absent a search warrant based on probable cause. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 (1981)
(search of an individual requires search warrant unless certain exceptions can be
shown); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (search of a person without a
search warrant is per se unreasonable); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357
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In easing these restrictions, the T.L.O. Court first decided that
the fourth amendment requirement of obtaining a warrant prior to a
search was unsuitable in the school environment. 5 Second, the
Court lessened the level of suspicion needed to make the search of a
student constitutional.3 Ordinarily, for a search to be valid, even
one without a warrant, it must be supported by probable cause to
believe that a violation of a law has occurred. 37 The Court noted,
however, that when a balancing of governmental and individual interests suggests the public interest is best served by a fourth amendment standard of reasonableness less rigorous than probable cause,
it has not hesitated to adopt such a standard. 8 Supported by this
logic, the T.L.O. Court concluded that the public interest in education was best served when the legality of a search of a student depends not on a belief rising to the level of probable cause, but "sim'
ply on the reasonableness, under all circumstances, of the search."39
Determining the reasonableness of a search involves an inquiry
whether the action was justified at its inception and whether it was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference initially. 40 In the case of a search of a student it will
(1967) (search of person absent a warrant presumptively unlawful). However, in limited instances, the Court has waived the requirement. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968) (no warrant necessary to search when suspect is believed to be carrying dangerous weapon); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967) (prompt administrative inspections without warrant are valid in emergency situations). Ordinarily, even in instances where a warrant is not required, the search must be premised
upon probable cause to believe that a violation of the law has occurred. E.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (probable cause to believe
that car is carrying contraband is required to validate intrusion upon right to travel
without interruptions); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-6 (1968) (search of
known drug addict valid since premised on experienced judgment of police officer
rising to level of probable cause).
35. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 743. Accord Camara, 387 U.S. at 532-33 (1967) (warrant unnecessary to conduct limited inspection of dwelling in emergency).
36. T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. at 743.
37. Id. For a delineation on the characteristics of probable cause, see supra note
2. For a discussion of warrantless searches and the requirement of probable cause, see
supra note 34.
38. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 743. See, e.g., Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School
Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 481 (5th Cir. 1982) (school officials must have reasonable cause
for their actions), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983); In re C., 26 Cal. App. 3d 320,
102 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1972) (search for marijuana predicated on "good cause"); In re
B.G., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361, 523 P.2d 244 (1970) (search for drugs
predicated on "reasonable belief"). But cf. Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47
(N.D.N.Y. 1977) (search of classroom predicated on insufficient suspicion).
39. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 743.
40. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). For extreme examples of searches
where the scope greatly exceeded the circumstances which allegedly gave rise to the
search, see Stern v. New Haven Community Schools, 529 F. Supp. 31 (E.D. Mich.
1981) ("two-way" mirror installed in boy's lavatory); M.M. v. Anker, 477 F. Supp. 837
(E.D.N.Y. 1979) (strip search), aff'd, 607 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1979); Doe v. Renfrow, 475
F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (strip search), modified, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980);
Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (where an entire fifth grade class
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usually be justified at its inception where there are reasonable
grounds to suspect that the search will reveal evidence in violation
of the law or the school rules.4 ' As long as the methods used for
conducting the search are reasonably related to the objectives of the
search, and the search itself is not excessively intrusive in light of
the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction, it
4
will be held valid. 2
In applying the "reasonableness under all circumstances" standard to the facts of this case, the Court found that Mr. Choplick's
search of T.L.O.'s purse was reasonable for fourth amendment purposes and, consequently, reversed the judgment of the New Jersey
Supreme Court.4' Regarding the initial search of T.L.O.'s purse, the
Court stated that, regardless whether the cigarettes had a direct
bearing on the infraction alleged, if Mr. Choplick had a reasonable
suspicion to believe T.L.O. was carrying cigarettes, the possession
would have weakened the credibility of her denial to the accusations. 44 Such a possibility provided a sufficient nexus between the
item searched for and the infraction under investigation, despite the
fact that the possession would have been mere evidence of a violation of school rules. 46 Additionally, Mr. Choplick's belief that T.L.O.
was strip searched after one student claimed three dollars were missing from his coat
pocket; no money was found). For interesting newspaper accounts of searches bordering on the extreme, see generally Jackson (Miss.) Clarion-Ledger, Oct. 6, 1978, at 1A,
col. 4 (entire class of fifth and sixth grade girls individually ordered to raise their
dresses and lower their underpants in attempt to find the girl responsible for leaving
a soiled sanitary napkin on the lavatory floor); N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1982, at B3, col.
1 (students met at school by thirty security officials who, as the students entered the
school, individually searched them with handheld metal detectors).
41. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 744.
42. Id. See, e.g., State v. D.T.W., 425 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(prevalence of problems involving weapons on campus gave school the right to patrol
parking lot and student's rule violation was in plain view of patrolling teacher); Doe
v. State, 88 N.M. 347, 540 P.2d 827 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975) (students' conduct, after
being caught smoking between classes, gave rise to teacher's reasonable suspicion that
students had been smoking marijuana); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y.
1977) (strip search following alleged theft of money was unreasonable because there
was no "present danger" to other students); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558
P.2d 781 (1977) (search of student following phone tip was reasonable in light of
prevalence of drug dealing on campus and possibility of contraband being destroyed).
Accord Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (school's limitation of student's constitutional rights is justified when student's behavior "materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others").
43. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 747 (1985), rev'g In re T.L.O., 94 N.J.
331, 463 A.2D 934 (1983).
44. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 746.
45. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 746. Compare Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967),
observing that:
The requirements of the Fourth Amendment can secure the same protection of
privacy whether the search is for "mere evidence" or for fruits, instrumentalities or contraband. There must, of course, be a nexus-automatically provided
in the case of fruits, instrumentalities or contraband-between the item to be
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possessed cigarettes was not itself unreasonable because the requirement of reasonable suspicion is not a requirement of absolute
46
certainty.
Having determined that the initial search was constitutional,
the Court then found the subsequent search, which led to the discovery of marijuana, constitutional as well.' 7 The Court noted that
Mr. Choplick's discovery of the rolling papers gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the purse contained contraband. This reasonable
suspicion, therefore, justified his conducting a more thorough search
of T.L.Q.'s handbag.4' Based on this reasoning, the Court concluded
that the New Jersey Supreme Court erred when it ruled that the
evidence be excluded from T.L.O.'s juvenile proceedings. 9
In holding that the New Jersey Supreme Court erred, the
T.L.O. Court correctly reasoned that a student's rights do not necessarily preclude school officials from conducting searches when necessary to fulfill their educational responsibilities.6 0 Also well reasoned
was the Court's holding that neither a warrant nor the strict probable cause standard is required in the school setting." However, in
construing the reasonableness standard in light of the recognized legitimate expectations of privacy held by students and the particular
facts of the case, the Court should have been compelled to rule that
the search of T.L.O.'s purse was unconstitutional for two reasons.
First, the search of T.L.O.'s purse constituted a full scale intrusion
into an area of expected privacy. 2 The Court, nevertheless, used the
reasonableness standard to determine the validity of the search. 3
seized and criminal behavior. Thus in the case of "mere evidence," probable
cause must be examined in terms of the cause to believe that the evidence
sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction.
Id. at 306-07.
46. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 746. See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971)
("sufficient probability," not certainty, acts as the touchstone of "reasonableness"
under the fourth amendment).
47. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 746-47.
48. Id. But cf. M.M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d 588, 589 (2d Cir. 1979) (probable cause
required for highly intrusive searches, "resonableness" required for less intrusive
searches).
49. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 747. The Court commented that, in holding that the
search of T.L.O.'s purse did not violate the fourth amendment, it was not determining the applicability of the exclusionary rule to the fruits of unlawful searches in the
school setting.
50. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 743-44 (1985).
51. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 742-43.
52. In concurring with the majority on the "reasonableness" standard, Justice
Brennan noted that a student's purse typically contains items of a highly personal
nature. The search of such an adolescent's purse could prove extremely embarassing
for a school official to rummage through since they often contain friend's notes, caricatures of school authorities, love letters, and items of personal hygiene. T.L.O., 105
S. Ct. at 751 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 745-47. But see In re T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 339, 463 A.2d 934, 942
(1978) where the court noted: "The assistant principal did not have reasonable
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This unqualified application of the reasonableness standard was an
unprecedented expansion of the standards the Court has historically
applied to full scale searches.5 4 Second, the search of T.L.O.'s purse
was initiated when she violated a minor school rule. The Court,
however, failed to consider the nonthreatening nature of T.L.O.'s
conduct which precipitated the search when it applied the reasonableness standard.56 In failing to distinguish the type of conduct
which would warrant a search, the Court ignored precedent by holding the standard applicable to all school searches involving breaches
of school rules or the law.5 7 By not clarifying the parameters within
which these searches should be confined, the Court seriously impaired students' fourth amendment rights to be free from unwarranted state searches and seizures.
Many studies have indicated that our public schools face serious
problems of crime and discipline. 8 As noted by the T.L.O. Court,
the frequency of these problems demand that school officials be able
to deal swiftly and effectively when confronted with them. 59 Accordingly, and in line with precedent, 0 the Court departed from the
grounds to believe that the student was concealing in her purse evidence of criminal
activity or evidence of activity that would seriously interfere with school discipline
or order. (emphasis added).
54. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (probable cause can be
replaced because seizure was so minimally intrusive); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
(balancing test applied to limited search of outer clothing); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (probable cause required for a full scale search). Accord
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983) (brief detention of luggage for
"canine sniff'); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (brief frisk); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (characterizing intrusion as minimal);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882 (1975) (brief border stop of an
automobile, lasting less than a minute, where Court noted "any further detention
must be based on consent or probable cause").
55. For a discussion of the school rule T.L.O. allegedly violated, see supra note
8.
56. For a discussion of the "reasonableness standard" and its application to the
T.L.O. case, see supra notes 40-46and accompanying text.
57. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 762-63 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 742. See generally Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae at 24-5, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985) (discussing the virtual
"state of chaos" of the schools); Elam, The Gallup Education Surveys: Impressions
of a Poll Watcher, PHI BETA KAPPAN MAG., Sept. 1983, at 22 (statistical data from
several surveys on the problems facing our schools); NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION, NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARD'S RESEARCH ACTION BRIEF (1982) (Educ. Research Instit. Clearinghouse Catalog No. Ed-208-453) (data on drug abuse and violence in our
public schools).
59. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 743 (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975)).
60. E.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701-02 (1983) (absence of practical alternatives); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978) (warrants are generally required where the "exigencies of the situation do not show the search to be
reasonable under the fourth amendment); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968)
(officer required to take immediate steps to determine if suspect is armed); Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1966) ("hot pursuit" of fleeing suspect); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948) (exceptional circumstances are needed to dispense with the magistrate's warrant requirement).
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fourth amendment dictates requiring that a school search be predicated on a warrant or probable cause."1 By substituting the fourth
amendment's inherent balancing test" for its own, the Court fairly
accommodated both the school's interests in preserving order and
the student's expectations of privacy. Through its holding that the
validity of school searches will be assessed by this reasonableness
standard, the Court reinforced its long held belief that "education is
perhaps the most important function of government.""3 As Justice
Blackmun accurately stated in his concurring opinion, "the special
need for an immediate response to behavior that threatens either
the safety of school children and teachers or the educational process
itself justifies the Court in exempting school searches from the warrant and probable cause requirement." 4
After adopting this well reasoned, well supported standard,
however, the Court applied it in a dangerously unprecedented way,
weakening the fourth amendment's fundamental purpose.6 5 Previous
Supreme Court decisions support the proposition that the prerequisite of a full scale search is probable cause." Only those intrusions
that are substantially less than full scale searches will be justified in
61. See, e.g., Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 481 (5th
Cir. 1982) (school official must have "reasonable cause" for his action), cert. denied,
463 U.S. 1207 (1983); State v. D.T.W., 425 So. 2d 1383, 1386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(reasonably prudent person would be suspect of the presence of contraband); M. v.
Board of Educ. Ball-Chatham Community Unit School Dist. No. 5, 429 F. Supp. 287
(S.D. Ill. 1977) ("reasonable cause to believe"); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47, 53
(E.D.N.Y 1975) ("some articulable facts providing reasonable reasons to search student"); Jones v. Latexo Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223, 236 (E.D. Tex. 1980)
("reasonable cause to believe" contraband would be found).
62. In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), Justice Blackmun commented on the inherent balancing test of the fourth amendment, stating:
While the Fourth Amendment speaks in terms of freedom from unreasonable
seizures, the Amendment does not leave the reasonableness of most searches to
the judgment of courts or government officers; the Framers of the Amendment
balanced the interests involved and decided that a search is reasonable only if
supported by a judicial warrant based on probable cause.
Id. at 722. Only in those instances where exceptional circumstances are present,
which make the warrant or probable cause requirement impractical, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framer. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct.
at 749 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
63. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 750 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). See also State v. Mora, 423 U.S. 809, 822
(1975) (where the Court noted: "It is essential that the youth of this nation learn that
the magnificence of our Constitution is founded upon genuine rights and not mere
platitudes").
64. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 750 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
65. The basic purpose of the fourth amendment is to safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials. Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). See also Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (the fourth amendment recognizes "the
right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men.").
66. For a list of these decisions, see cases cited supra note 54.
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accordance with a balancing test, provided that the test gives sufficient consideration to the privacy interests infringed.17 At no point
does the Court, or even the petitioners in their brief, cite to a case
where a full scale search was upheld on less than probable cause."
In Terry v. Ohio," which involved the stopping and frisking of a
suspect, the Court acknowledged that the search was justified because the officer conducted a carefully limited search of the suspect's outer clothing.7 0 Analogously, several federal courts have recently viewed a purse or handbag as "the functional equivalent of
clothing, '7 1 "an extension of the person,"' "7 to be afforded the same
degree of protection traditionally given to the body because it is
more a personal item than a mere object. 7 Ironically, in Terry,
where the reason for the search was to determine if the suspect was
carrying a weapon, the Court emphasized the limited nature of the
intrusion when it held the search valid.7 4 In T.L.O., however, the
Court completely failed to recognize the seriousness of the intrusion
even though the reason for the search was only to gain evidence to
discredit T.L.O.'s denial. The Court should have held that where a
search in question is more than a minimally intrusive Terry type
search, a school official is prohibited from searching a student unless
"a specific threshold of need,"' 5 as designated by the fourth amendment requirement of probable cause, is exhibited.76 By failing to follow the tenet that "as the intrusiveness of the search intensifies, the
standard of Fourth Amendment reasonableness approaches probable
cause, '7 7 the Court sharply deviated from precedent.78 Through this
deviation, the Court has inadvertently exposed students' expected
67. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979).
68. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 753-55 (Brennan and Marshall, J.J., dissenting).
69. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
70. Id. at 30.
71. E.g., United States v. Johnson, 475 F.2d 977, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (purse left
unattended on table falls within bounds of search warrant since it is not being worn
or appended to person); United States v. Teller, 397 F.2d 494, 496 (7th Cir. 1968)
(purse becomes a mere household item when left open on bed), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
937 (1971); United States v. Riccietelli, 259 F. Supp. 665, 666 (D. Conn. 1966) (not in
actual possession of pocketbook therefore not considered search of person but of
object).
72. United States v. Teller, 397 F.2d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 937 (1971).
73. E.g., United States v. Johnson, 475 F.2d 977, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (personal
item appended); United States v. Teller, 397 F.2d 494, 496 (7th Cir. 1968) (when
worn or possessed by owner), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 937 (1971); United States v. Riccietelli, 259 F. Supp. 665, 666 (D. Conn. 1966) (when in actual possession). See generally Annot., 29 A.L.R. 4TH 771 (1984) (lawfulness of warrantless search of purse or
wallet).
74. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
75. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 754 (Brennan and Marshall, J.J., dissenting).
76. Id.
77. M.M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d 588, 589 (2d Cir. 1979).
78. See supra note 54.
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79
rights of privacy to arbitrary invasions.

The Court adopted a two-pronged test to determine whether a
search was in fact "reasonable." ' 0 First, whether the search was justified at its inception and, second, whether the search was reasonably related to the circumstances that gave rise to it. The Court, however, in applying this test to the facts of the case, failed to
distinguish the type of violation that would justify the application of
the reasonableness standard."1 By omitting any distinction, the
Court held that all infractions of the law and school rules are
equivalent despite contrary case law. 2 Distinguishing between minor and more serious infractions in evaluating the reasonableness of
a search "is not a novel idea."s Cognizant of this, the New Jersey
Supreme Court advised the state's lower courts to consider several
factors in determining whether a school official had reasonable
grounds to search a student.8 4 These factors included the student's
history, school record, the prevalence and seriousness of the problem
in the school to which the search was directed, and the exigency to
make the search without delay. 8 Under this analysis, the search of
T.L.O.'s purse would have been justified if Mr. Choplick reasonably
believed T.L.O. was concealing evidence of a criminal activity or evidence of an activity that would seriously interfere with school discipline or the safety of others. T.L.O., however, was accused of a minor school infraction.8" She was a model student who had no prior
record of any disciplinary infractions.8 " Further, the State of New
Jersey never introduced evidence that she presented any serious
threat to school safety. "
79. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 756-57 (Brennan and Marshall, J.J., dissenting).
80. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 744. For a discussion of this two-prong test, see supra
text accompanying note 40.
81. For the Court's application of the test to the facts of this case, see supra
text accompanying notes 41-42.
82. Criminal laws have been traditionally distinguished between minor and serious offenses, classifying them accordingly as misdemeanors and felonies. Courts have
also considered the severity of the offense in determining the appropriate sentences.
See generally W. LAFAV, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 6 (1972) (distinguishing offenses by degree).
83. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 2098 (1984) (search of a home following
minor traffic violation). See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582-83 (1975) (distinguishing between students' conduct that poses immediate threat to school safety and
conduct that is simply in violation of minor disciplinary rules).
84. In re T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 346, 463 A.2d 934, 941-42 (1983), reversed, 105 S.
Ct. 733 (1985).

85. Id.
86. For a discussion of the actual rules T.L.O. was accused of violating, see
supra note 8 and accompanying text.
87. Supplemental Brief for Respondent at 25, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 115 S. Ct.
733 (1985).
88. Id. Cf. In re L.L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N.W.2d 343 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979) (one

factor in determining whether a search for a weapon was valid was the student's history of carrying weapons).
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Likewise, the cases relied upon by the T.L.O. Court lend little
support to its reasoning. The cited cases mostly involved students
that had been accused of criminal violations,89 substantial disturbances of school order 0 or where the integrity of the educational
process was at odds with student behavior."1 Few involved minor
rule infractions similar to the no smoking rule that T.L.O. allegedly
violated. s2 T.L.O.'s conduct was not unlawful, did not pose a serious
threat to student or teacher safety, and was not disruptive of school
order, thus the Court should have affirmed the New Jersey Supreme
Court, finding the forcible opening of T.L.O.'s purse completely unjustified at its inception and in its scope.93
New Jersey v. T.L.O. held simply that a search of a student by
a school official need not be predicated on the fourth amendment
requirement of a warrant or probable cause. ' The official need only
have a reasonable suspicion to believe that the student has violated
or is violating the law or school rules.9 " Such a search will be constitutional if, after considering all the circumstances, it is "reasonable."9 " This is a laudable holding. It ensures some aid to public
school officials faced with the responsibility of educating our children in environments often plagued with crime and drug abuse."
89. See, e.g., Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 979 (6th Cir. 1984) (search for
marijuana), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 1749 (1985); D.R.C. v. State, 646 P.2d 252, 253
(Alaska App. 1982) (stolen money); In re Christopher W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105
Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973) (search for marijuana); State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869, 870 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1971) (search for marijuana of student known to experiment with drugs);
M. v. Board of Educ. Ball-Chatham Community Unit School Dist. No. 5, 429 F.
Supp. 288, 289 (S.D. I1. 1977) (same).
90. E.g., In re L.L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N.W.2d 343 (1979) (search of a student
suspected of carrying a weapon).
91. E.g., R.C.M. v. State, 660 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (student with
bloodshot eyes wandering the halls when students were required to remain in the
classroom for midterm exams).
92. E.g., State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975) (search of three
students after making secretive gestures and then showing signs of guilt), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039 (1975); Doe v. State, 88 N.M. 347, 540 P.2d 827 (1975) (student
searched for pipe after teacher witnessed him smoking in violation of school rule).
93. In re T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 339, 463 A.2d 934, 942 (1983), reversed, 105 S. Ct.
733 (1985).
94. 105 S. Ct. at 743. For the reasoning the court used to reach this holding, see
supra text accompanying notes 35-39.
95. Id.
96. T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. at 743-44. For a discussion of what factors the Court looks
at to determine reasonableness, see supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
97. For an analysis of the data regarding the problems facing our nation's public schools, see supra note 5 and accompanying text. The Attorney General as Amicus
Curiae commented:
The sad truth is that many classrooms across the country are not temples of
learning teaching the lessons of good will, civility, and wisdom that are central
to the fabric of American life. To the contrary, many schools are in such a state
of disorder that not only is the educational atmosphere polluted, but the very
safety of our students and teachers is imperiled.
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 23, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733
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Nevertheless, the extent to which the Court applied this broad ruling portends a serious weaking of students' constitutionally protected rights to privacy and security.98 The Court acted without precedent in allowing school officials to conduct full scale searches
without sufficient justification. 9 The impact of this ruling in the
schools will undoubtedly be to teach the students a vital lesson.10 0
Unfortunately, however, that lesson is one inconsistent with the
teachings of the fundamental guarantees of this nation. As Justice
Stevens stated in his dissent:
Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential to the
meaningful exercise of rights and responsibilities by a self-governing
citizenry. If the Nation's students can be convicted through the use of
arbitrary methods destructive of personal liberty, they cannot help
but feel that they have been dealt with unfairly.'
School officials cannot hope to teach the lessons of good citizenship
when they themselves are allowed, as in T.L.O., to disregard the ba0 2
sic values embodied in the Constitution.

Timothy G. Kelly

(1985).
98. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 757 (Brennan and Marshall, J.J., dissenting).
99. For an analysis of the Court's reasoning on this matter, see supra text accompanying notes 43-49.
100. See, e.g., Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1027 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), where Justice Brennan commented: "we do not know
what class petitioner was attending when the police dogs burst in, but the lesson the
school authorities taught her that day will undoubtedly make a greater impression on
her than the one her teacher had hoped to convey."
101. T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. at 760-61.
102. Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1027-28 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).

